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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant accepts the Statement of Facts of West Valley
City, particularly as it supplements the Statement of Facts
set forth in Appellant* s Brief on Appeal.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
JUDGE ATHERTON* S RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT1 S CASE
REASSIGNMENT ESTABLISHES MANIFEST NECESSITY FOR THE
PREVIOUSLY DECLARED MISTRIAL IS ERRONEOUS.
Certain matters which the Defendant initially determined
should be briefed, no longer appear to be in issue.

West

Valley City has assisted in focusing the issues by agreeing
with Patten that jeopardy had attached in this bench trial,

and

candidly conceding that Patten did not waive his right to

object to termination of the trial.
Both parties are in agreement that the U.S. v Perez, 22
U.S.(9

Wheat)

579,

580,

6

L.Ed.

165

(1824)

"manifest

necessity" formulation, reconfirmed many times by the United
States Supreme Court, Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
800, 98 S. C. 824 (1978), and by this Court, State v. Wilson,
854 P.2d 1029 (Ut. App. 1993), is the appropriate standard to
apply in determining whether retrial is barred on principles
of double jeopardy.
A further point of agreement is that the use of specific
language such as the words "legal necessity"
necessity"

is not required.

or "manifest

Patten agrees that it is not

necessary for a trial court to utter particular magic words.
Patten does not however agree with the City's primary
argument that "Judge Nehringfs recusal and reassignment of the
case is ' manifest necessity* for a mistrial and falls within
the exceptions contained in § 76-1-403, Utah Code annotated."
Appellee's Brief, p. 10.
The immediate difficulty with this argument is that Judge
Nehring made no such finding of fact, conclusion of law, or
ruling.

The record reflects the special pains he took to make

clear that the mistrial was based upon the appearance of a an
entirely unrelated conflict:
JUDGE:
Well, then I'm just going to go into a
little more detail about. . . .

2

STONEY: And then Ifm going to respect what
the court says. I just wanted the objection on the
record,
JUDGE:
•••.;d it's noted, and my concern, just
so it's on the record is this, that the prospect of
possible conversations with attempts to manipulate
prosecution of a criminal case in order to advance
a client's interest in a civil case is so
distasteful a piece of conduct, but it's still
something that this relationship suggests might be
available, and it's because of that possibility,
that appearance, that I've made this ruling. And
I'll close again by saying there's no direct
evidence that that has happened. Thanks for your
patience. We'll be in recess.
Tr. Judge1 s Ruling, p. 5; emphasis added.
Judge Nehring* s written order

wli i :11 is the version

drafted by the City, is likewise clear and unambiguous.
.>>

first sets forth the "FACT;

i e ..- i

mistrial:
Plaintiff called witness and adduced evidence
during the course of the trial. During the course
of trial, testimony disclosed that the alleged
victim had retained private counsel to act on her
behalf in various divorce proceedings.
The
victim's private counsel is the wife of a West
Valley Assistant Prosecutor.
taking of
evidence ceased at -^nt point.
It then states,
(

'

•

•

•

•

-

•

N

While there is no direct evidence of impropriety
and the Court is extremely confident that there
was, in fact, none. The Court finds that the mere
possibility of conversations between the Assistant
Prosecutor and his wife, the victim's private
attorney, suggests an appearance of impropriety
such that the Court, sua spontef
on its own motion
and against the prosecutions objection, declares a
mistrial. (R. 67, 68,)

3

It
:

Then follows the specific Order stating that,
Court declares a mistrial .•. . "

M

[t]he

(R. 68)

In ruling on Patten's Motion to Dismiss (R. 169), Judge
Atherton failed to address any of these factual findings or
the legal conclusion flowing therefrom.

Instead she chose to

rest her decision on a basis Judge Nehring did not assign and
which the record does not support.

Her ruling that there was

a "clear and compelling" basis in the record for declaring a
mistrial on other grounds than those stated is erroneous.
Judge Nehring did not declare a mistrial on either the
factual or legal basis that he was required to recuse himself.
He took the step of reassigning

(he did not use the word

" recuse" ) the case only after declaring a mistrial and stating
the reasons therefor.

Tr. Judge's Ruling, pps. 2-3.

Even

then he did so for reasons he apparently saw no reason to
particularize and which do not appear on the face of the
record.

His statement to the effect that he had participated

in "discussions of possible resolutions of the case" and knew
quite a bit "beyond what I've heard from witnesses and beyond
what' s on the record" appears to be announced somewhat offhandedly.

He reports no particular untoward

effect

such

discussions may have had upon him one way or another, other
than

to

say

his

continued

involvement

would

be

"inappropriate," nor does he elicit any comments from counsel
as to their reaction to the reassignment or their possible
willingness to allow his continued participation.
4

'. '

The focus

of attention by both counsel and the trial court was the
"impropriety," observed during the course of trial, which in
Judge Nehring' s view compelled the mistrial, not the fact that
he was reassigning the case to another judge,
Ruling, pps. 2-5.
or even unusual.

Tr. Judge' s

None of this was inappropriate, improper,
Having declared a mistrial, trial was over.

Nothing was at stake; he was free to reassign the case for
whatever reasons he so desired.
Judge Atherton' s ruling second guesses Judge Nehring* s
post trial decision in its statement that "(T)he basis of the
judgefs reassignment of the case is...fprejudicial conduct in
or

out

of

the

courtroom

not

attributable

to

the state,

mak(ing) it impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state." (R. 173)
Nehring

made

no

such

finding

supported by the record.

and

her

conclusion

Judge
is not

It cannot simply be taken for

granted that because he saw fit to reassign the case after
terminating the trial for reasons he expressed with clarity,
that unspecified prejudicial conduct had occurred of the kind
which any reasonable trial judge would act upon by recusing
himself had such conduct occurred during the course of the
trial, any more than it can be assumed that such alleged
misconduct

should

not

be

attributable

to

the

state.

Certainly, although it is a moot point (trial was over), there
is no evidence from which to conclude, arguendo, that it would
have "be(en) impossible to proceed with the trial without
5

injustice to the defendant or the state."
added.
specific

Id;

emphasis

Had there not been a mistrial already declared on
grounds, it is

sheer

speculation

to attempt

to

determine what Judge Nehring might have done upon the basis of
other grounds which are not elaborated or even discussed with
counsel.

It suffices to say that the record in this case does

not constrain the conclusion that his recusal and consequent
mistrial would have been compelled by the Code of Judicial
Conduct had trial otherwise continued.
Judge Nehring stated the basis for ordering a mistrial as
is appropriate.

In order for this Court to competently review

a mistrial order, the termination statute, § 76-l-403(c),
U.C.A., requires that the trial court make specific findings
and state a basis in the record for declaring a mistrial.
State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 360 (Utah, 1979)("[W]e have no
basis from which to conclude whether the court engaged in the
scrupulous

exercise

of

judicial

discretion

required

dealing with the important rights here involved.");

when

State v.

Castle, 951 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Ut. App. 1998)(M[I]n entering its
order of mistrial, the court should have more closely tracked
the statutory language.11) In fact the judge was quite precise
in enunciating his basis for declaring a mistrial.

It was

not, however, as the City urges, any perceived need to recuse
himself.

And it does not follow that recusal following a

mistrial necessarily suggests that the former flowed from the

6

This is sheer post

latter•

hoc

ergo

propter

hoc

reasoning,

unsupported by any more substantial connection or logic.
The case law cited by the City fails to address this
issue.

The decisions the City relies upon are primarily those

in which

the trial

judge discovers

a conflict

mid-trial

because of his own personal relationship to one or more of the
witnesses, or because of an overwhelming bias or impartiality
developed

during the course of trial as a result of the

conduct of one of the litigants, or similar circumstances,
which were then stated with due particularity on the record in
support of a sua

sponte

declaration of mistrial.

For example, in State v. Graham, 960 P. 2d 457 (Wash. App.
Div.

2

because

1998),
he

the trial

discovered

judge recused

that

one

of

himself

the

police

mid-trial
officers

testifying before him was an employee of a city for which he
was the city attorney.

Having found himself in a blatant

position of conflict, he inquired whether the parties would
consent to his further participation.
refused, he declared a mistrial.

When the defendant

That is not this case.

Here Judge Nehring observed the appearance of impropriety,
"the prospect

of possible conversations with attempts to

manipulate prosecution of a criminal case in order to advance
a client's interest in a civil case...something that this
relationship suggests might be available, and its because of
that possibility, that appearance, I've made this (mistrial)
ruling...."

Judge's Ruling, p. 5. This conclusion is, so far
7

as can be determined from the record, totally unrelated to his
decision to reassign the case.
Graham, and other cases upon which the City relies,
stands for the proposition that "where a trial judge properly
exercises his discretion to recuse . • . ' manifest necessity'
is established for the resulting mistrial"
speaks of the "resulting" mistrial.
from Judge Nehring* s recusal.

Id. 460.

Graham

But no mistrial resulted

A mistrial was declared.

Only

thereafter did recusal occur.
It is noted in Graham that a showing either of bad faith
or

negligence

requirement:
necessity"
situation."

is

antithetical

to

the

manifest

necessity

"...[n]egligent behaviors can negate "manifest
where

there

Id. 461.

is

an

alternative

to

cure

the

This is not of course to suggest that

there was either bad faith or negligence in Judge Nehring1 s
reassigning the case.

There were undoubtedly no attempts to

"cure the situation" because at the time of the recusal there
was literally nothing to cure;

trial was over.

The City cites State v. Bailey, 465 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. App.
1995) for the proposition that

"...where the decision to

declare a mistrial is bias on the part of the fact finder, the
trial court's decision to declare a mistrial is entitled to
the highest deference."

Id. at 286. See also Commonwealth v.

Liester, 712 A. 2d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) cited by the City.
No doubt this is correct law, but inapposite to this appeal.
Judge Nehring simply made no such ruling.

8

The City however stresses that the authorities require
great deference be paid to the decision to declare a mistrial.
If this is intended to apply to Judge Atherton?s decision, it
is completely misplaced.

Judge Atherton was not present at

trial and could have had no notion what information Judge
Nehring may have acquired off the record.

The rationale for

granting deference to a trial court1 s mistrial decisions is
that the trial judge, being physically present during the
course of proceedings, has first hand and therefor greater
knowledge and familiarity with the facts, circumstances, and
dynamics of the trial and attendant circumstances.

Arizona v

Washington, 98 S.C. 824, 832, 434 U.S. 497, 510, 54 L.Ed. 2d
717 (1978).

Consequently, there is no basis whatsoever to

afford Judge Atherton' s decision any deference.

See also

Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1194, 1296 (Ut.
App. 1996).
The City argues that Judge Nehring' s mistrial ruling
should be given great deference, even though he did not rule
that he was ordering a mistrial for the reason that he was
required to recuse himself. This is illogical. Judge Nehring
ordered

a

mistrial

because

he

saw

extrinsic to his own participation.

a

conflict

entirely

This decision, which the

City concedes is in error, would be entitled to deference for
all the reasons previously stated.

Having made the decision,

he then found it appropriate to transfer the case, a decision
which is entitled to no deference whatsoever in relation to

9

the preceding mistrial because it has no necessary logically
connected.
The City argues that an unsigned docket entry establishes
that the mistrial was actually founded upon Judge Nehring' s
recusal.

Appellee's

incorrect.

Brief,

p.

11.

This

is

likewise

An unsigned docket entry cannot alter what the

judge actually ordered and is legally insufficient as a basis
upon which to assess the merits of his decision.
Shioii, 671 P.2d 135,(Utah 1983);

Shioji v.

Ron Shepherd Insurance,

Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994).
POINT II
JUDGE NEHRING' S CONJECTURED MISTRIAL RULING ON
GROUNDS OF RECUSAL MUST BE GIVEN CLOSE APPELLATE
SCRUTINY.
The

City

nonetheless

asserts

that

Judge

Nehringf s

mistrial order should be given great deference if some other
support in the record can be found for it.

In addressing

exactly this point, the U. S. Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Washington, supra, reasoned as follows:
If the record reveals that the trial judge has
failed to exercise the "sound discretion" entrusted
to him, the reason for such deference disappears.
Thus, if the trial
judge acts for reasons
completely unrelated to the trial problem which
purports to be the basis for the mistrial ruling,
close appellate scrutiny is appropriate. Cf. U.S.
v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631 (CA5 1976).
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S. Ct. 824, 54 L.
Ed. 2d 717, (1978) foot note 28; emphasis added.
Judge Atherton ruled that Judge Nehring correctly ordered
a mistrial

but

for the wrong
10

reason, i.e.,

"for

reasons

completely unrelated to the trial problem which purports to be
the basis for the mistrial ruling,"

Id, The City adopts this

view and urges that this Court afford great deference to Judge
Nehring' s decision.

But analyzed against the backdrop of the

logic of Arizona v. Washington, id., the contrary position is
the proper one.

Thus this Court should give the mistrial

ruling, not great deference, but, instead, close scrutiny.
Beginning with the basics, it is well settled that the
"manifest necessity" doctrine is designed to accommodate the
defendant's valued constitutional right to have his trial
begun and completed by a particular tribunal. Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.C. 834, 837, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1949);
State v. Ambrose, supra, 598 P.2d 354, 358, (Utah 1970).

It

was formulated to appropriately characterize the heavy burden
placed

upon

the

prosecution

to

demonstrate

jeopardy does not preclude re-trial.

that

former

Arizona v. Washington,

supra, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.C. at 831.
Considering

the

meaning

of

the

words

"manifest

necessity," given its common sense interpretation, "manifest"
means "patently obvious."

It has been formally defined as,

"To show plainly; to make to appear distinctively; to put
beyond question or doubt; to display; to exhibit; reveal;
prove;

evince;

evidence."

Webster's

Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1938.

International
Elsewhere it

is defined as, "Clearly apparent to the sight; obvious."

The

American Heritage® Concise Dictionary, Third Edition, Houghton
11

Mifflin,

1994.

The word

"necessity"

variable meaning depending on its usage.
means a "high degree" of necessity.

is said

to have a

In this context it

Arizona v. Washington,

supra, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.C. at 831.
Applying these definitions to the case at bar, it cannot
be said that it is manifest, i.e., plainly shown, beyond
question or doubt, or obvious that had Judge Nehring not
declared a mistrial on the basis announced, he would have
found a "high degree" of necessity to recuse himself and
declare a mistrial on the basis of having heard matters off
the record.

It is not plainly shown in the record that he had

any reason other than the one he recited for granting the
mistrial and it is not sensible to bootstrap his post-trial
decision to reassign the case into a basis for the mistrial
itself.
POINT III
A
MISTRIAL
RESULTING
FROM
RECUSAL
REQUIRES
FUNDAMENTALLY
DIFFERENT
CONSIDERATIONS
FROM
REASSIGNMENT AFTER DECLARING A MISTRIAL,
THE
FORMER IS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION, WHILE THE
LATTER IS INCONSEQUENTIAL.
The critical distinction between recusal during trial and
reassignment

after

trial

is

that

prior

to

declaring

a

mistrial, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
have his trial begun and finished before the same tribunal.
Wade v. Hunter, supra, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.C. 834, 837, 35
L.Ed.2d 425 (1949);
358,

(Utah 1970).

State v. Ambrose, supra, 598 P.2d 354,
But once mistrial has been declared, no
12

such

constitutional

contrary,

right or privilege

as is the case with all

obtains.

On

the

litigants, civil or

criminal, an accused has no right to demand a particular judge
before whom to be tried.
Once jeopardy attaches in a bench trial, the defendant
has a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to have
his trial completed by the same judge, "the valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."
Hunter, supra; State v. Ambrose, supra.

Wade v.

After declaring a

mistrial, the defendant has no right whatsoever to be tried
again by the same judge.
Different standards apply and the differential in the
gravidas of the two situations

is enormous.

Because an

accused enjoys a constitutional right to have his or her trial
completed by the same court, no judge would take lightly his
or her obligation as fact finder to complete a criminal trial
once begun.

After the trial is terminated, however, any risk

of transgressing an accused' s constitutional rights disappears
completely; there is no error whatsoever even if the judge has
no basis for transferring the case.
be harmless in the extreme.
prejudiced.
constitutional

Any claimed error would

The defendant simply cannot be

It is the fundamental difference between the
right to be free from being twice put in

jeopardy, and no right at all.

The former is of paramount

concern, while the latter is entitled to no consideration
whatsoever.

13

It must be assumed that Judge Nehring and counsel were at
least on some level aware of this distinction.

Close scrutiny

of the record bears this out. Little concern or attention was
paid to the reassignment.

The same cannot be said regarding

the basis of the mistrial ruling.
Consequently, it is evident that Judge Nehring* s recusal
cannot, on the state of this record, provide a basis for
sustaining Judge Atherton* s ruling that there was a compelling
basis for his ordering a mistrial.

A "manifest necessity" is

not and cannot be shown.
CONCLUSION
The Memorandum Decision of Judge Atherton denying Mr.
Patten* s Motion to Dismiss on double jeopardy grounds should
be reversed with directions to the trial court to dismiss the
combined cases.

^

DATED this p^*J

day of January, 1999.

^

I

^

^ Attorney for
- ^
Defendant/Petitioner
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